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For this year’s Rosenkranz Debate, we have been asked to debate the question: 
Lochner v. New York: Still Crazy After All These Years? It is my job to defend 
the “negative” position. My burden is not to establish that Lochner was correctly 
decided, but merely that it was not “crazy.” I intend to meet that burden and 
exceed it. I intend to show how Lochner v. New York was not at all crazy; in fact, 
it was a reasonable and good decision. 
I am pleased that my debate partner Akhil Amar decided he was going to 
defend John Marshall Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York and 
not the egregious—and more famous—Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. dissenting 
opinion. Because Holmes’s dissent is so extreme in its deference to legislative 
discretion, defending Harlan’s far more reasonable dissent is much easier for 
Akhil to do. And, if he had chosen to defend Holmes’s extreme opinion, then 
Akhil would be in the same position as Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, with whom I 
debated at the Rosenkranz Debate ﬁve years ago.1 
See Federalist Soc’y, Sixth Annual Rosenkranz Debate: Courts Are Too Deferential to the 
Legislature, YOUTUBE (Nov. 16, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=evp84_XcSwY. 
We would just have to repeat 
that debate all over again, and that would be boring. So, by abandoning Holmes, 
Akhil has made this debate much more interesting. 
I am going to approach this issue textually, as I know Akhil also likes to do. I 
will first talk about Lochner as a Due Process Clause case, and secondarily as a 
Privileges or Immunities Clause case. I will contend that the approach of the 
Lochner Court was a faithful application of the original meaning of these two 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Everyone knows that Lochner applied what is today commonly called the Due 
Process Clause. It has been falsely characterized, however, as applying what is 
now called “substantive due process.” By “substantive due process,” I mean the ju-
dicial doctrine of (a) somehow identifying certain rights as “fundamental,” (b) ele-
vating these rights to some heightened status—a very heightened status, as 
compared with other mere “liberty interests”—and then (c) subjecting any laws 
restricting the exercise of these fundamental rights to strict scrutiny, which those 




But this is not at all what the Lochner Court did. To be sure, the Lochner Court 
did talk about liberty of contract. It did not, however, apply anything resembling 
modern substantive due process. 
The term “substantive due process” itself was a term of opprobrium generated 
by progressives to criticize the Supreme Court’s Due Process Clause decisions. It 
was not a label the Court itself used, and the Supreme Court did not adopt that 
label until relatively recently. I think what the Court was using in Lochner was 
the Due Process of Law Clause. (We normally call this clause the “Due Process 
Clause,” but it is the “Due Process of Law Clause.”) And, the Due Process of 
Law Clauses in both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments say that no person 
can be deprived of “life, liberty or property” without “due process of law.” That 
is, the law applied must be a valid law.2 
In this case, Joseph Lochner was deprived of both his property and his liberty. 
He was fined for violating the Bake Shop Act, thereby depriving him of his prop-
erty, and then he was jailed for failing to pay the fine, depriving him of his liberty. 
The constitutional requirement of “due process of law” poses two questions. 
First, was the legislation that deprived him of his property and liberty really a 
“law,” or was it—as Samuel Chase said in Calder v. Bull—“[a]n act of the legis-
lature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social 
compact [that] cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority?”3 
Second, does the “due process of law” guarantee a judicial forum in which a per-
son can contend that this act of legislation was not truly a law? 
Let us begin by asking whether the statute at issue in Lochner was “a rightful 
exercise of legislative authority.” To answer this question about a federal law like 
the Affordable Care Act or the Controlled Substances Act, we need to evaluate 
the substance of the law to see whether it has been authorized by an enumerated 
power. For example, a Commerce Clause challenge would also be a Fifth 
Amendment Due Process of Law Clause challenge: It is “the due process of law” 
that gives individual persons a process or procedure to challenge a law imposed 
upon them as being beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause power. On this 
account, every enumerated-powers case is a Fifth Amendment case as well, 
because the Due Process of Law Clause assures a process by which the substance 
of a law can be assessed as within or without the power of Congress to enact. 
The Bakeshop Act, of course, was enacted by the legislature of the state of 
New York, which requires us to ask: What about the powers of states? What 
would make an act of a state legislature ultra vires or beyond its proper power? 
Well, in addition to a Due Process of Law Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment 
also includes the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which says that, “[n]o State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
2. Evan Bernick and I explain and defend this conception of the Due Process of Law Clauses at 
length in Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, No Arbitrary Power: An Originalist Theory of the Due 
Process of Law, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
3. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (emphases added). 
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citizens of the United States.”4 To see if a law depriving a person of their life or 
liberty is truly a law, we need therefore to ask, as a textual matter, if this legisla-
tive act abridges the original meaning of privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States. 
What, then, are these privileges or immunities? To address this question, we 
must begin with George Mason’s 1776 draft of the Virginia Declaration of 
Rights. I consult Mason’s draft rather than the actual version adopted two weeks 
later by the Virginia Provincial Convention, because the adopted version watered 
down Mason’s draft, and it was his draft language that was emulated by other 
states.5 
Mason’s draft began: “That all men are born equally free and independent, and 
have certain inherent natural rights, of which they cannot, by any compact, 
deprive or divest their posterity[,] among which are, the enjoyment of life and lib-
erty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and 
obtaining happiness and safety.”6 
First Draft of Virginia Declaration of Rights (ca. May 20–26, 1776) [hereinafter First Draft] 
(emphasis added) (spelling and capitalization altered), http://www.gunstonhall.org/georgemason/ 
human_rights/vdr_first_draft.html [https://perma.cc/8H8L-F4BD]. 
This language soon became the canonical ren-
dering of natural rights. 
Some two weeks after it was written, Thomas Jefferson had Mason’s draft in front 
of him on his desk when he was composing the Declaration of Independence.7 
Jefferson truncated the “inherent natural rights . . . of life and liberty, with the means 
of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and 
safety” to the “unalienable rights” of “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”8 
Mason’s draft was subsequently adopted in various similar formulations by the 
states of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Vermont.9 
We know that in Massachusetts, Mason’s formulation was considered judi-
cially enforceable, because in 1783, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
used the language to hold that slavery was unconstitutional in that state. In the 
Quock Walker Case, the Court said—among other things and without resorting to 
implication—that “in constructing the Constitution, slavery is, in my judgment, 
as effectively abolished as it can be by the granting of rights and privileges 
wholly incompatible and repugnant to its existence,”10 referring to the very same 
wording that George Mason had proposed. 
When it came time to draft amendments, Representative James Madison did 
not initially anticipate that constitutional amendments would be added as a list at 
the end of the Constitution; he assumed an Article V “amendment” would 
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
5. See RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION 39–40 (2016). 
6.
7. See generally PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE, 97–153 (1977) (detailing Declaration’s drafting). 
8. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (capitalization altered). 
9. BARNETT, supra note 3, at 40. 
10. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760– 
1848, at 47 (1977) (quoting Commonwealth v. Jennison). 
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literally “amend” or alter the original text. With that assumption in mind, 
Madison proposed Mason’s canonical language be added to the Preamble: “That 
government is instituted and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people, 
which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and 
using property, and of generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and 
safety.”11 When Madison presented his amendments to the House, he described 
each of the amendments he was proposing. “The first of these amendments,” he 
said referring to the Mason-inspired language, “relates to what may be called a 
bill of rights.”12 
Akhil is one of the earliest scholars to realize that, in fact, the term “the Bill of 
Rights” was not initially used to describe the first ten amendments to the 
Constitution. The label “the Bill of Rights” was not associated with the first ten 
amendments until at least after the Civil War. More recent studies have shown it 
was not until the 1920’s or 1930’s that the first ten amendments came to be called 
“the Bill of Rights.”13 So it is significant that when Madison mentioned “what 
may be called a ‘bill of rights,’” he was referring to George Mason’s canonical 
description of fundamental natural rights, and not to his other proposals that 
formed the basis of the first ten amendments. 
In the beginning of his proposed bill of rights to be added to the Preamble, 
Madison wanted an affirmation “[t]hat government is instituted and ought to be 
exercised for the benefit of the people, which consists in the enjoyment of” their 
natural rights. This too echoed Mason’s draft declaration, which affirmed, “[t]hat 
Government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common Benefit and Security of 
the People, Nation, or Community.”14 
With Mason and Madison’s “bill of rights” language in mind, let us now move 
closer to the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the original Constitution, there 
is a Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV. To what did “privileges and 
immunities” refer? The canonical case defining these “privileges and immun-
ities” was Justice Bushrod Washington’s 1823 circuit court opinion in Corfield v. 
Coryell. In the middle of a lengthy passage, Justice Washington summarizes 
these “privileges and immunities” as: “Protection by the government; the enjoy-
ment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every 
kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety.”15 By now, you will recog-
nize this as Mason’s description of natural rights and better appreciate why I refer 
11. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
12. Id. at 453. 
13. GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, THE HEART OF THE CONSTITUTION: HOW THE BILL OF RIGHTS BECAME 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS (2018); Pauline Maier, The Strange History of the Bill of Rights, Address for the 
Hart Lecture at Georgetown University Law Center (2013), in 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 497 (2017); 
Michael J. Douma, How the First Ten Amendments Became the Bill of Rights, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 593 (2017). 
14. First Draft, supra note 4. 
15. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (emphasis added). 
440 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16:437 
to it as “canonical.” To this formulation, Justice Washington also added, “[t]o 
take hold and dispose of property, either real or personal.”16 
Washington’s language was repeatedly invoked by those who drafted and 
defended the Fourteenth Amendment to explain the meaning of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause. Not only do they cite Corfield v. Coryell, they also specifi-
cally quoted this passage. For example, when explaining what are the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States, Jacob Howard, who was the spon-
sor of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate, read verbatim Justice 
Washington lengthy description of “privileges and immunities” in Corfield. 
Howard then added: “To these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be, 
for they are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise na-
ture, to these should be added the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the 
first eight amendments of the Constitution.”17 In other words, for Howard, first 
came the rights stated in Corfield—which Madison considered to be “a bill of 
rights”—and then came the rights that were enumerated in what we now call “the 
Bill of Rights.” 
The last piece of pre-Fourteenth Amendment text I will mention is the wording 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. You will notice that, so far, the sources refer to 
the rights of private property. Although they do not expressly reference the right 
of contract, this is necessarily included within the right to “dispose of property,” 
which would be by gift, bequest, or contract. The centrality of the right of con-
tract as a privilege or immunity of citizens was made explicit in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, which included the rights “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, to 
be parties and give evidence, to inherit, to purchase, to lease, to sell, and to hold 
and convey real and personal property.”18 
The Civil Rights Act was passed pursuant to the enforcement power dele-
gated to Congress by Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment. Yet 
President Andrew Johnson vetoed the Act on the ground that it was outside of 
this delegated power of Congress. Some in Congress, most notably including 
Representative John Bingham, also questioned whether the Thirteenth 
Amendment truly gave Congress the power to enact the Act. They were also 
concerned that the Democrats would repeal the Act, as they pledged to do upon 
resuming their seats in Congress. 
For these reasons, Bingham and others undertook to ground these privileges or 
immunities in the Constitution itself, so the rights protected by the Act would 
bind the courts and would be insulated from repeal. Their efforts would eventu-
ally culminate in the Fourteenth Amendment. After its ratification, Congress then 
formally reenacted the Civil Rights Act to ensure its constitutionality. The 
enforcement power granted Congress in Section Five of the Fourteenth 
16. Id. at 552 (emphasis added). I will return to “dispose of” shortly. 
17. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2765 (1867). 
18. 14 Stat. 27–30 (emphasis added). 
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Amendment then justified the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to protect 
“the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” 
With all this in mind, there can be little doubt that, historically, the rights of 
property and contract were among the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States to which the Fourteenth Amendment referred. The Constitution 
now affirmed that “no state shall make any law” abridging these rights of their 
citizens. The Due Process of Law Clause of the Fourteenth then adds a right to a 
process by which citizens may challenge the substance of a legislative act abridg-
ing their fundamental liberties—their privileges or immunities—as not a proper 
law. 
But then what? Was the Lochner Court19 so extreme that it applied what we 
would now call “strict scrutiny” to every regulation of the freedom of contract? 
To the contrary. I can think of a statute that significantly regulated liberty but that 
the Lochner Era Court nevertheless upheld. It happened in a case by the name of 
. . . Lochner v. New York. And the law it upheld was called the Bakeshop Act, 
which regulated the minutiae of the bake shop industry. This included, for exam-
ple, the ceiling height, the composition of the floors, the location of washroom 
facilities, and much more. All these regulations are reproduced in the Court’s 
opinion in Lochner. They all were upheld by the Court in Lochner as reasonable 
health and safety regulations of liberty. 
There was only one provision of the extensive Bake Shop Act that the Lochner 
Court questioned: the maximum-hours law, which was added to the Act by the 
bake shop union. No doubt aware of its origin—though the decision does not 
mention it—the Court employed what by that time had become the traditional 
way of evaluating whether a police power regulation was within the power of the 
legislature to enact: it asked whether the law was irrational or arbitrary.20 
The majority concluded that the law was arbitrary in part because the 
maximum-hours restriction was only applied to bakeshop employees and not to 
workers in other businesses. The Court looked at the appendix that had been filed 
by Joseph Lochner, which included much social science research from the time, 
primarily involving the English bake shop industry. That research purported to 
demonstrate that baking was no more dangerous or unhealthful than many other 
occupations. Singling out the bake shop workers, therefore, was an arbitrary exer-
cise of power. Nor did the law protect bake shop owners, who were allowed to 
work more than sixty hours per week in the very same conditions in which the 
bake shop workers were being allowed to work. If working that many hours was 
so unhealthy, why were bake shop owners allowed to do it? 
It is important to note that the law was found to be “arbitrary” insofar as it did 
not fit as a means to a legitimate health and safety police power legislative end. 
19. “The Lochner Court,” in fact, was a term that did not get invented until Gunther started calling it 
“The Lochner Court” in the 1970s. 
20. See generally Barnett & Bernick, supra 2 (examining the traditional inquiry into the arbitrariness 
of an exercise of the police power). 
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So, the Court concluded, it must have been passed for “other motives.”21 By this, 
the Court meant a purpose that was not within the legitimate police power of a 
state to enact. In this case, that improper purpose was siding with one party in a 
labor contest—here the bakeshop unions—and against the other—here the mom 
and pop, small, ethnic bakeshops that had, unlike more industrialized bakeries, 
resisted unionization. 
So, the Bake Shop Act was arbitrary and irrational in the sense that there was 
inadequate evidentiary support for it being a genuine health and safety law. 
Justice Harlan disputed the facts on which the majority based its decision, so 
there was a good-faith disagreement about the application of the due process of 
law in the case at hand. But, although the opinions are not completely clear, 
Harlan also appeared to adopt a different presumption and burden of proof to es-
tablish the reasonableness of restrictions on liberty. I believe, for the majority, the 
burden of proof is more or less on the legislature to establish that the legislative 
act was a valid exercise of its proper authority, while Justice Harlan wanted to 
adopt a rebuttable presumption of constitutionality. But only Holmes urged that 
the thumb irrebuttably be placed on the scale against a member of the general 
public and ultimate sovereign, like Joseph Lochner, and in favor of his servants in 
the legislature. 
For all these reasons, I submit that a case like Lochner v. New York would not 
have been “crazy” in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or 
Immunities Clause and Due Process of Law Clause were adopted. It was not 
“crazy” in 1905, when it was decided. Indeed, it was generally supported by 
newspaper editorials at the time.22 It did not become a public issue until 
Theodore Roosevelt made it a political cause when he ran as a Progressive Party 
candidate in 1912.23 As a presidential candidate, he criticized Lochner and 
praised Holmes, whom Roosevelt had put on the Supreme Court.24 
Most importantly, for purpose of this debate, it would not be “crazy” after all 
these years for courts, as the Court did in Lochner, to realistically examine regula-
tions to ensure that they are neither irrational nor arbitrary restrictions on the priv-
ileges, immunities and liberties of We the People—each and every one.  
21. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
22. BERNSTEIN, supra note 14. 
23. Id. See also BARNETT, supra note 4. 
24. BARNETT, supra note 4, at 130–34. 
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